Showing posts with label Lidl. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Lidl. Show all posts

Monday 28 August 2017

Drawn & quartered

Every quarter the UK retail market share figures make stimulating reading...winners, loses... but what are you meant to do with it?

Last week's Kantar Worldpanel trumpeted the huge news: Lidl is now the number seven grocery retailer in the UK.

What I found just as interesting was what's not being more clearly called out: inflation & store numbers

Hurrah! Inflation is driving top-line. So it should. The problem is, if you are not tracking ahead of inflation, you are still declining - and the big 4 are struggling and will largely continue to do so.

Tesco showing like for like growth should surprise no one. They have been rationalising their store base, so those staying open will see a natural rise in traffic as shoppers go to their next nearest Tesco.

If the Booker deal doesn't proceed. What then? If it does, Tesco will find themselves focused on store and supply chain optimisation and there are real risks of loss of short-term focus on the core as management time deals with structural property issues

Asda are stymied. The have the wrong store footprint for 2017 and beyond. They know it - but it's hard to see what they can do about it. They have over 600 stores, but for how long? They will need to find bottom line efficiencies to compensate for real terms top-line stagnation

JS are also in a bind, their NISA bid looks decidedly less tasty after the Morrisons/McColls coup and is already and unsurprisingly rumoured to be on hold. They have to hope the Argos move really delivers.

So of the four, only Morrisons seem to have their act together at the moment, but even then the McColls deal is not a slam-dunk and will have to deliver value. It buys Morrisons time, maybe two or three years as the deal expands their effective store base

The real inflation-busting action is happening in Lidl and Aldi who together notched up total market share gain of 1.3% points. And they are achieving this off a still-developing store base and c. 2000 SKUs many of which are confined labels

These factors are the killers. The limited range has a very limited impact on the number of items per trip shoppers buy, but they have a massive impact on system efficiencies and price. And will continue so to do. The more stores they open, the more winning they will do.

So here's a thought, when you see the quarterly share data, take half and hour and think about your business and retail customer investment choices moving forwards and consider what insights might be drawn

  • Do the inflation check - who is winning, really
  • Make sure you are modelling each chains store numbers and development plans into your thinking - where will each chain be in 1, 3 and 5 years - and what share will they have?
  • If you aren't learning how to win with Aldi and Lidl, you are already losing
  • If you are a food business - make sure you have a credible out of home strategy
  • And I didn't even get to Amazon yet



Friday 4 August 2017

Morrisons: The safer way than Safeway




Morrison's capturing the McColl's supply contract is audacious. The decision to execute using the Safeway brand is not unproblematic.
Why so?
The continued expansion of Aldi & Lidl across the UK; JS's moves to acquire NISA and Tesco's drawn out deal to bank Booker means the battle for proximity store dominance is fully engaged and price competitiveness is crucial.
It is likely that most Safeway SKUs created will have an existing Morrison's counterpart and will be produced on the same lines. But this means more complexity for the factories to manage, more packaging, higher inventories of finished stocks, interrupted runs, more waste and overall impaired economics. This is unhelpful to McColl's; it could be damaging to Morrisons. Running with the existing Morrison's portfolio conversely would bring efficiency benefits to both.
Remembering Safeway?
Safeway is an old aunt who died some time ago. She wasn't anyone's favourite aunt and if truth were told, she had developed a rather unusual and not necessarily pleasant aroma over her last few years. Safeway disappeared in 2004 having seen customers flee away and then savaging itself with a programme of deep branded price cuts that proved self destructive. I dare anyone to name a signature Safeway SKU that they fondly recall or whose absence has been missed. Anyone making the "residual fondness" claim is either trying to post-rationalise or is seriously misguided.
A blow to Sainsbury & Asda
Whether this is a first step to a full acquisition of McColl's by Morrisons will have to be seen but overnight Morrison's have secured a serious grip on the UK proximity retail market. The deal blows a huge hole in JS's plans to acquire NISA. The value in that idea seems dead in the water. And it exposes Asda to the challenge of why they didn't see this play and make a move: as their sales continue to dip, there is no obvious path forward.
More reasons to drive with Morrisons
One can see the headline attraction of using the Safeway brand. Words like uniqueness and point of difference come to mind. And certainly one can make the case that it carries greater residual heritage than NISA's Heritage label. A less emotional view might have stressed the shared economic benefits of leveraging the Morrisons brand across the McColl's estate. Safeway may be nicer than NISA; but Morrisons is the safer way.

Wednesday 23 April 2014

Tesco: That David Moyes feeling...

Manchester United's ten month disastrous flirtation with David Moyes is over. To many, he had been "dead man walking" for months. Despite long-terms critics like myself incessantly calling for his head even before he was appointed, the prevailing mood among the faithful had been to tough it out. 


Moyes was Sir Alex Ferguson's pick and who could argue with that? I never understood the call to give him more time.  After all, why would you give a failing arsonist this luxury? Out of all competitions and no European football for the first time in two decades, time finally ran out for Moyes.



There are some striking parallels between Manchester United and Tesco - organisationally and managerially. Organisationally both have been at the top of their game for the past twenty years. 

Both had  leaders, peerless in their domestic arena who anointed their successors and both business models have been changing profoundly with the influx of massively funded competitors arriving seemingly from nowhere.

For United, the arrival of Abramovitch at Chelsea brought the first high profile billionaire in to the public glare but it is Sheikh Mansoor's arrival at Manchester City and his impending purchase of a new NYC MLS franchise that changed the game. At the same time the Qatari's bought Paris Saint Germain in France and spent $145m on new players last season. United, in transition, have been caught flat-footed.

In mass retail, Tesco are being outplayed by international competitors. Aldi and Lidl from continental Europe, Walmart in USA and UK. But it's the new, next generation giants Amazon and Alibaba that threaten to overwhelm mass retail globally. Tesco have plenty of ideas; possibly too many, without the bandwidth to deliver. Last week's announcement of the decision to open seven F&F Franchise stores in Boston was dwarfed by Uniqlo's declared intention for global fashion domination.

When Philip Clarke recently noted "bigger is no longer better", he was hinting at a problem Manchester United are also facing. Patchi prove how small focused retail businesses can deliver outstanding concepts - way better than anything a mass provider can execute. This is fine for niche, but neither Tesco or United are niche propositions. It's not “big isn't better”; it's more "the new big is bigger" - and for both soccer and mass retail, to play in the “new big world”, you need to have a deep reservoir of international cash to compete.

Asda (Walmart), Boots (Alliance-Walgreens), Aldi (Albrecht family), Lidl (Schwarz family), Sainsburys (25.99% owned by PSG's Qatari Sovereign Wealth Fund) and Superdrug (AS Watsons) appear to have the ownership structure to provide access to external capital. 

Tesco, big in local terms, may need a stronger, internationalised financial backer to secure their long term competitive future. Of concern, Berkshire Hathaway, one of Tesco’s two main institutional shareholders have been reducing their exposure. Similarly, United need to find investment minded billionaire owners to underpin their future.

In the ultimate paradox, United who have fallen furthest will turn around fastest.  United will hire a globally recognised football giant, who in turn will be given $150m and eighteen months to rebuild. Tesco, by contrast, retain their UK's #1 position, but their grip on share is slipping with challenges across their business model. None of this disappears whoever is in charge

Despite a torrid season and all the popular commentary calling for Moyes' exit, once the narrative became front and back page news, his position was untenable. 

Tesco has similar problems. Last weekend's heavyweight papers were filled with negative critique. Journalists are talking with fund managers: they speak of leadership replacements. The narrative is who and when, not if.  Interestingly, former Tesco executive Tim Mason, fancied by some as Clarke's replacement, broke his fifteen month twitter silence last week, referencing two damning articles on Clarke's reign. The jockeying is well and truly under way.

It was never going to be easy filling their respective predecessors' shoes. Both Moyes and Clarke inherited organisations that had over-traded their pasts whilst competitors were investing for new tomorrows. If Philip Clarke reads today's papers he might be forgiven for feeling he has been visited by the ghost of Christmas future. It's that David Moyes feeling...

Wednesday 9 April 2014

Tesco: Time to reset the clock


Yesterday's latest Kantar Worldpanel data brought little comfort for any of the UKs Big four retailers. The 0.4% drop in Sainsburys' share versus last quarter highlights Justin King's personal astuteness in calling time on his own leadership at just the right moment. His touch is almost as measured as was Sir Terry Leahy's departure from Tesco.

But spare a thought for everyone still at Tesco. Retail is tough when your weekly numbers are perpetually red. Missed targets drive stress and undermine confidence in equal measure. This is especially hard when you are still market leaders. You should be winning, you should feel like winners. You don't and everyone senses your pain. It is suffocating.
 
So what can they do? Tesco need a radical response and reset the clock on everyone's expectations. 

First, Tesco should explain to the markets what a great job they did historically in driving national UK coverage. Noting Asda's announcement this week of their intensifying moves South; Tesco can proudly note they are the only one of the top four UK retailers with a truly national footprint. They got there first, it has provided a competitive advantage for a period of time, but not forever.

Second, it follows Tesco should reset long-term expectations of their natural market share being somewhere between 20%-25% of the UK market. This will cause pain to the share price in the short to medium term - but it is a statement of inevitability. Tesco cannot open new physical stores as fast as others because they already have their footprint. And they can't acquire anything meaningful given their market share position. Furthermore, for all the success of on-line, the evidence so far is that it’s only a mechanism to slow Tesco's rate of share loss.

It is worth recognising for every new store opened by a competitor, as a rule of thumb, 30 pence of every pound through their tills comes directly from Tesco. So with Aldi, Lidl, Asda and Waitrose still expanding; who knows what course Mike Coupe will set for Sainsbury; and Amazon / Ocado expanding their remits: holding as much ground for as long as possible is Tesco's challenge.

Third, Clubcard needs a structural rethink.  Critics note it has evolved from being a strategic builder of store loyalty into a driver of supplier promotional investment. If the phoney price war ever starts, suppliers will be caught between the investing directly in price or through Clubcard mechanics: both may not be affordable. 

A simple switch in emphasis could prove powerful. Instead of offering schemes to let you redeem Clubcard vouchers outside of Tesco, they should work with third parties to give Clubcard vouchers to reward non-Tesco purchasing. Eat in Cafe Rouge - earn extra Clubcard points and bring the spend back in store. Likewise with Petrol: Tesco’s pump prices are already competitive- stop giving money off fuel in-store, give store vouchers on petrol sales instead.

These points are not panaceas. They bring pain.  Yet they will allow Tesco to celebrate "still above 25%" on each set of results, enable them to approach right-sizing based on a reframed future and refocus Clubcard on driving traffic in-store. Most importantly, they reset the clock on market expectations and buy Tesco some much needed breathing space. 

Thursday 3 April 2014

Aldi: The Tinned Tomato Test

Want to know how Aldi deliver outstanding product quality and unbelievably low prices?  Simple really. Take the tinned tomato test. 


 How many SKUs of tinned tomatoes do you need in a retail portfolio? (I am not discussing Passatas, Purees or any other variation on a theme, just tinned tomatoes..I mean, how complicated can that be?). 

How complicated? Aldi have 3, Tesco have 36, half of them Tesco own brands. 

Everyone understands simplicity beats complexity in the battle for cost leadership; but quality leadership too?

Ever since Aldi and Lidl first dropped anchor, the major retailers took the view if you could match the discounters price with your cheapest on display offer, you were doing enough to hold your own. Price was the variable to match; quality was located higher up the ladder.

Hmmmm....really?  Aldi's UK website features 22 separate quality awards over the last 2 years: Cheese, Wine, Baby, Frozen - demonstrating outstanding quality can go hand in hand with portfolio simplicity and low prices. 

Category for category, the major retailers can match Aldi's quality and prices; they just struggle to do both jobs in a single product.

When Aldi's Mince Pies beat Fortnum & Mason - all historic assumptions of price / value equations go out the window: Waitrose quality at Asda Smartprice prices. WOW.

If you can't beat them, join them. Fewer products of outstanding quality will drive higher velocities, lower costs and lower prices. It will also mean fewer suppliers. And branded manufacturers better get with the programme because defending inflated brand to own label price premiums will be squeezed like never before.

Aldi - like brands, just simpler. And that's how they do it. Simple really.



PS...It's not all about Aldi....The International Wine & Spirits Competition (IWSC) 2013 awarded Lidl UKs Western Gold Bourbon a Gold Outstanding Award and and ranked it 7th in the top 13 Bourbon's in the world. 

Lidl UK Western Gold Bourbon Whiskey 6 YO
Comment: "Concentrated citrus and rich honey on the nose with lovely, light bourbon backing. Slow entry onto the palate with easy flow and deep rich fullness without being heavy. In fact moves lightly and with elegance. Lovely mature flavors with caramel, malt, corn and a hint of smoke. Hints of banana and more honey lead into fine finish."
Award: Gold Outstanding
Read more: http://www.businessinsider.com/the-13-best-bourbons-in-america-2013-10?op=1#ixzz2xo1QFbBn